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MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2003
To appropriate additional sources of fiscal revenue, the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
started direct underwriting of new deficit-financing government bonds (GBs)
(BOJ underwriting) on November 25, 1932. This paper examines the BOJ’s
underwriting policymaking process through the use of newly available archived
documents from the BOJ and the Ministry of Finance (MOF).
Evidence from these documents contradicts conventional arguments that 
the BOJ was forced to underwrite GBs due to Finance Minister Korekiyo
Takahashi’s firm request and that it regarded the policy measure as temporary.
Instead, the BOJ was confident it could exert monetary control through the 
market operation of selling underwritten GBs (selling operations). In addition,
the BOJ willingly accepted the underwriting, expecting it to reinforce its 
influence over financial institutions.
BOJ policymakers partly forecasted the course of events. First, the BOJ started
underwriting during the Takahashi economic policy period (1931–36). Once it
started, it was difficult for the BOJ to stop underwriting bonds. The BOJ was
forced to continue underwriting deficit-financing bonds because of expanding
financial demand. Second, the MOF used very complex and irregular budgeting
methods beginning with the budget process of fiscal 1936. This created a large
deferred fiscal burden that concealed the realities of fiscal deficits.
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underwriting); Joint Research Committee; Currency system; Market
operation by selling government bonds; Continuing expenditure;
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Finance Minister Junnosuke Inoue’s lifting of the gold embargo in Japan in January
1930 and shifting to a tight fiscal policy (the so-called Inoue economic policy,
1929–31) caused an outflow of specie and severe deflation. The exhausted economy
and spread of military action in China (the Manchurian incident) required an 
expansion of public finance. During this critical period, an experienced finance 
minister, Korekiyo Takahashi, returned to office. The shift to an active fiscal and
monetary policy and the introduction of a virtual fiat money system (the so-called
Takahashi economic policy, 1931–36) enabled the government to meet its new fiscal
requirements, such as those stemming from sending troops to Manchuria, and public
works expenditures.
To appropriate additional sources of fiscal revenue, the BOJ started direct 
underwriting of new deficit-financing bonds (BOJ underwriting) on November 25,
1932. As became clear later in the course of self-criticism by the BOJ and the Ministry
of Finance (MOF), this was a very important decision in the financial history of
Japan.
1 Therefore, innumerable attempts have been made to clarify the economic
effects of BOJ underwriting.
2 On the other hand, little effort has been made to 
evaluate the “politico-economic” aspects, such as the policy formation process, the
decision-making process, and the implementation process of BOJ underwriting. 
This paper thus examines the issue of BOJ underwriting from a politico-economic
viewpoint and indicates that Inoue’s subordinates (in the MOF and the BOJ) argued
for a more expansive monetary and fiscal system even under tight budget conditions.
First, this study examines the policy formation process. On this point, previous
works point out that Takahashi’s ideas and efforts were based on advice from 
Eigo Fukai, BOJ Vice-Governor, who emphasized the need to stimulate business by
supplying money through the financial market operation of buying GBs (buying
operations). The impact on the Japanese economy of Fukai’s proposal and
Takahashi’s decision is well known.
3 However, it is unclear why Takahashi chose BOJ
underwriting over buying operations, even though the former was a more direct way
of granting credit to the government than the latter. Shima (1983), who emphasized
the personal relationship between Takahashi and Fukai, has written the only study on
this issue. Due to the lack of records, the roles of political actors other than Takahashi
and Fukai, and the thoughts of other members of the MOF and the BOJ concerning
policy and system design, are unclear.
4
Second, this study investigates the decision-making process. Most research 
examining political interaction between the MOF and the BOJ assumed a “financial
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1. The BOJ later asserted that it regretted agreeing to the underwriting of deficit-financing bonds in the autumn 
of 1932. The BOJ also pointed out this was the first step toward losing its central banking function, and was 
the greatest failure in its 100-year history (Bank of Japan [1984], pp. 55–56). The MOF also noted that many
intellectuals asserted that BOJ underwriting which extended credit to the government created the foundation for
inflation (Ministry of Finance [1969], p. 33).
2. For a discussion on the changes in economic structure after BOJ underwriting, see Nakamura (1994), lecture No. 2.
3. See Bank of Japan (1970) and Miwa (1979).
4. Historical materials concerning the formation process of BOJ underwriting are scarce. Memoirs by Fukai are
regarded as the only source of information. For this paper, thoughts of policymakers from the BOJ and the MOF
about the BOJ underwriting policy have been clarified, through internal records.subordination hypothesis,”
5 which asserts that monetary policy was subordinate to
fiscal policy. In previous literature, the BOJ has been regarded as a passive agent,
lacking the capacity for making independent decisions. Also, the BOJ’s ideological
confrontations and compromises with the MOF have rarely been discussed.
However, we should pay attention to the BOJ’s advantages in monetary control. This
study shows that BOJ officials did not consistently oppose underwriting, although
they were basically cautious about it, and that discretionary selling operations were
systematized in exchange for accepting the underwriting because the BOJ officials
wanted to reinforce their influence over financial institutions.
Third, this study tries to clarify the implementation process during the Takahashi
economic policy period. Many commentators cite the BOJ’s monetary control and
the MOF’s fiscal management in this period as a successful example of business 
stimulation. However, such a view ignores the relationship between monetary 
policy and fiscal management, especially budget policy, in this period. As a result 
of emphasizing the success of monetary and inflation control, this view serves as the
historical basis for the revival of the contemporary argument of adjustment inflation.
Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the problems of policy management in the
Takahashi economic policy period relative to fiscal management.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II examines the views and system
design of the BOJ and MOF officials in relation to the monetary system and BOJ
underwriting. It has been generally assumed that BOJ underwriting was initiated
because the BOJ was persuaded by Takahashi’s firm request and accepted it as a 
temporary measure.
6 This paper reexamines this assertion and clarifies the origins 
of the new monetary control system and the BOJ underwriting, by analyzing 
discussions from the Joint Research Committee of the MOF and BOJ for Improving
the BOJ System (the Joint Research Committee), established in February 1930. In
Section III, the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy is discussed. In the
Takahashi economic policy period, as business recovery emerged, the issuance of
deficit-financing bonds was reduced and domestic prices were stabilized (the shift 
to a tight fiscal policy, 1935–36). However, this process adopted very problematic
budgeting methods and the shift to a tight money policy failed. Consequently, the
BOJ underwriting continued.
II. The BOJ and the MOF in the Joint Research Committee
A. Discussions of the Currency System and the Limits of the BOJ’s Purchase 
of GBs
Discussion of the BOJ’s institutional reform started with the establishment of the
Research Committee on Financial Systems in 1926.
7 Its establishment was an MOF
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5. This term is from Mabuchi (1994). Although the expression is different, see also Endo (1954) and Ouchi (1976).
For discussion of the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy, see Colm (1955) and Schmölders (1981).
6. Bank of Japan (1984), p. 54.
7. Yoshino (1962), chapter 2, section 4.initiative, and it tended to reflect MOF opinions.
8 After the report “Research on the
Commercial Bank System” was submitted to this committee, the Banking Law was
formulated in 1927. The document “Research on the BOJ” was drawn up in June
1927 and addressed reforms in the central banking system,
9 which could be regarded
as a summation of the arguments for BOJ reform in the second half of the Taisho
Period.
10 However, due to the financial crisis in March 1927, the committee never
deliberated on the reforms. After this crisis passed, the MOF and the BOJ agreed to
reexamine the central banking system. Thus, in February 1930, the Joint Research
Committee was established as an unofficial entity,
11 and it would continue functioning
until 1931. Although the results of this committee’s arguments were never enacted
either, due to the Manchurian incident, the contents are both extensive and 
bold. The members discussed banknote issuance systems, organization, business
activities (especially the relationship between the central bank and the market, and
matters that needed authorization of the government), payment to the government,
arrangement of statutes, and other issues. I will now clarify the historical position of
the report of the 1930–31 Joint Research Committee, by comparing it with the final
version of “Research on the BOJ,” which was drawn up by the 1927 Research
Committee on Financial Systems.
First, members of the MOF and the BOJ were interested in discussing a system of
banknote issuance. At the time, the Japanese banknote issuance system was called the
“elastic limit system.” Under this system, banknotes were issued as a statutory issue
dependent on specie reserves, as a fiducial issue subject to certain limits by legislation,
and as an excess issue. The excess issue was regarded as exceptional, and the BOJ had
to pay a tax on it. However, the outflow of gold after the lifting of the gold embargo
in January 1930 made excess issuance a normal condition. The BOJ and the MOF
both regarded this condition as problematic,
12 and were inclined to make the 
banknote issuance system flexible. They stated that “the chief aim of the system of
banknote issuance is not only to secure convertibility but also to maintain the 
flexibility of the currency.”
“Research on the BOJ” opted to revise upward the maximum limit of fiduciary
issue. In August 1928, the MOF expressed its intention to adopt a proportional
reserve system as follows: “As a reserve specie for conversion, the BOJ can hold either
gold coins, gold bullion, silver coins, or silver bullion the equivalent to at least 
40 percent of the total amount of banknotes issued.”
13 This implies that the limit 
of banknote issuance was 2.5 times that of the specie reserve. Given that the amount
of BOJ specie holdings was ¥826 million in 1930, BOJ banknote issuance of 
¥2,065 million was theoretically possible.
This was a substantial extension compared with the maximum limit of fiduciary
issue at that time (¥120 million). It is unlikely that the MOF planned such an
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8. Yoshino (1962), p. 283. The Preparatory Committee on Financial Systems was established by the MOF. The
Chief Secretary to the Exchequer was the chairman, and the MOF’s highest officials were committee members.
9. Bank of Japan (1973).
10. Yoshino (1962), p. 289.
11. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the first meeting, BOJ archive.
12. “Nihon-Ginko-Enkakushi (The Collection of Historical Records of the Bank of Japan), Series 3, Overview 1.”
13. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the first meeting, BOJ archive.extreme expansion of currency issue under the tight fiscal rules of the gold standard.
Rather, it seems that the MOF’s real aim was to control or restrain specie and make
banknote issuance flexible by adopting a proportional reserve system.
14 Just after
returning to the gold standard in December 1929, the specie reserve was ¥1,073 million.
However, it decreased by ¥309 million during 1930 and by an additional ¥400 million
by the end of 1931, and the amount of BOJ note issuance also decreased by about
¥200 million during 1930. Since the BOJ and the MOF maintained a high interest
rate policy to reduce specie outflow, bank loans decreased and the depression deepened
further. Consequently, a sharp decrease in tax revenues resulted, leading to a decline 
in revenue, which significantly damaged the credibility of the MOF’s fiscal and 
monetary control.
15
“Research on the BOJ” asserted that a proportional reserve system was appro-
priate for saving specie, and this was a solution to the above problem the MOF 
confronted. In the proportional reserve system, the BOJ only had to hold specie at a
fixed rate (for example, 40 percent in “Research on the BOJ”) to the BOJ note
issuance. Therefore, “even if an outflow of gold occurs, it will not restrain convertible
banknote issuance until the decrease in gold reserves reaches the amount of the 
statutory reserve. It will not have a direct influence on the reduction of currency.” 
In the end, a proportional reserve system was not adopted, but by proposing such 
a system, the MOF wanted to save gold as specie reserve and remove the obstacle to
fiscal and monetary control.
The BOJ responded to the MOF’s above discussion in the Joint Research
Committee as follows:
16
1. The reason to positively support the proportional reserve system is unclear.
2. Although it is argued that an elastic limit system is based on currency principles
and a proportional reserve system on banking principles, there is no clear 
distinction between the two in terms of banknote issuance.
3. In the case of a proportional reserve system, banknote issuance can reach a level
not allowed in a fiduciary issue.
4. Possible remedies for when specie reserves increase and the currency expands
are inadequate.
5.  There is no clear difference between the two systems under an extreme 
financial situation.
6. Revising the system of banknote issuance should be considered in the context
of the central bank system as a whole.
However, as a BOJ committee member stated, the BOJ was neither directly
opposed to the proportional reserve system nor seriously concerned with the choice
of a banknote issuance system. Rather, whichever system was adopted, the central
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14. In “A Proposal from the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce & Industry,” the members of the Tokyo Chamber of
Commerce & Industry proposed a proportional reserve system as follows: “By adopting a proportional reserve 
system, it will be possible to save specie or increase flexibility of convertible note issue.” See Bank of Japan (1973).
15. Ministry of Finance (1969), p. 24.
16. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the fifth meeting, BOJ archive.bank executives considered it necessary to impose a maximum limit on banknote
issuance, or to limit a fiduciary issuance by some method.
17 That is, the BOJ’s main
concern was systematic control of the amount of the currency issue.
Consequently, agreement was reached on the following two points.
18
1. Expansion of the maximum limit of a fiduciary issue, under the elastic limit
system, to at least ¥500 million.
2. Considering that the BOJ’s specie reserve holdings were in crisis during this
period, the minimum ratio of specie reserve should be less than 40 percent if
the proportional reserve system were adopted.
The BOJ then worked out the following compromise on the framework of the
currency system. “We should basically maintain the present elastic limit system and
then appropriately extend a maximum limit of fiduciary issue. When adding a factor
for the proportional reserve system, we should clarify the relationship between the
amount of banknote issuance and specie holdings. If so, we can construct a system
where the amount of the maximum fiduciary issue can be settled automatically and
which adequately improves the present system without giving the impression that the
present system is fundamentally revised.”
19 As a result, the Joint Research Committee
agreed upon a new banknote issuance system, which combined a fiduciary issuance
system with a proportional reserve system. It would have a maximum fiduciary
issuance limit of ¥500 million, and a minimum ratio of specie reserve exceeding 
30 percent of the amount of the convertible note issue.
20 It was a compromise for the
BOJ in that it agreed to adopt a proportional reserve system, which had been rejected
in “Research on the BOJ.”
21 However, the currency issue would be restricted as the
BOJ desired.
Once the committee determined the design of the currency issue system, the 
criteria for eligible collateral for a fiduciary issue came under discussion. A fiduciary
issue, whether in excess or not, needed safe and positive collateral besides specie, 
government securities, and commercial bills. For the BOJ, the amount of a currency
issue was influenced both by the extent and maximum limit of securities for the 
fiduciary issue. Therefore, to avoid easy currency expansion, it was rational for the
BOJ to assert the need for a limit on its GB holdings.
On this point, “Research on the BOJ” stated that “the amount of a fiduciary issue
not including commercial bills should be less than ¥120 million,” to “avoid excess
convertible note issuance.” However, at the same time, this document argued “since
we have introduced the effective restriction on the amount of the fiduciary issue,
there is no risk of the BOJ holding excess GBs and issuing excess convertible notes.
So there is no need to set a legal restriction on the purchase limit for GBs or the
amount of loans secured by GBs.” Thus, there was no purchase limit on GBs,
because there was a natural limit to the purchase amount of GBs as securities for 
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17. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 14th meeting, BOJ archive.
18. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 13th meeting, BOJ archive.
19. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 14th meeting, BOJ archive.
20. During the Takahashi economic policy period in June 1932, Finance Minister Takahashi and the MOF carried
out a bold reform of the currency system. The content of the reform was similar to these agreements, and we can
easily see that the discussion by the Joint Research Committee was closely connected with Takahashi’s reform.
21. The BOJ criticized a proportional reserve system in “Research on the BOJ,” because this system would cause too
much flexibility in a banknote issue. See Bank of Japan (1983), p. 338.a fiduciary issue and this guaranteed the stability of a currency issue. At that time, 
the policymakers probably assumed that the gold embargo would eventually be lifted.
If so, they felt a policy of increasing a currency issue through purchasing GBs 
was unrealistic.
The Joint Research Committee also discussed the pros and cons of purchasing GBs,
not commercial bills, as additional securities for a fiduciary issue. However, the BOJ
did not take a stand against its underwriting of GBs during committee discussions. 
The BOJ gave three reasons for holding GBs: as instruments for market 
operations, as reserves for payment of cost and amortization, and as a result of under-
writing at the government’s request.
22 Concerning the first reason, it is remarkable
that it raised the issue of selling operations since this was not yet considered a 
conventional policy tool (this will be discussed in detail later). The second reason
addressed needs in the BOJ’s day-to-day business. The third reason is problematic.
One BOJ participant indicated the risk of an excessive currency issue. However, 
he also stated that the GB holding by the BOJ was originally designed for the 
application for, underwriting of, and purchase of GBs, and he assumed underwriting
would be used in this way. It was also decided that the BOJ could purchase and hold
GBs as securities for a fiduciary issue.
23 The BOJ’s thinking paid much credence to
Japan’s history.
24 At the early stage of the BOJ’s history, specie was given to the 
BOJ by the government, and the function of a banknote issue was given with 
the condition that the BOJ hold GBs. Consequently the BOJ did not oppose the
underwriting of GBs. Instead, BOJ members presumed BOJ underwriting when they
discussed the purchase limit of GBs.
25
On the other hand, in addressing a purchase limit on GBs,
26 one BOJ participant
asserted that since the expansion of currency might be caused by BOJ underwriting,
GB purchases should be limited or there should be an effective restriction on the use
of securities for a fiduciary issue.
27 In other words, the BOJ wanted to set a limit on
its GB holdings, but was ready to accept limiting the holdings of GBs as securities for
a fiduciary issue as an alternative, as outlined in “Research on the BOJ.”
28
In the Joint Research Committee, the MOF opposed this proposal as follows:
first, if GBs held by the BOJ were sold off in market operations and additional 
GBs were underwritten, this was a de facto increase in underwriting. In this case, a
purchase limit was meaningless. Second, if a purchase limit on GBs were set, 
currency could not be flexibly supplied.
29 However, one BOJ participant asserted, 
“It is very difficult to directly restrict the amount of GB holdings. So if we try to
maintain a purchase limit on GBs to prevent the danger of an expanding currency
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22. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 33rd meeting, BOJ archive.
23. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 34th meeting, BOJ archive.
24. Suzuki (1966), footnote 82.
25. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 29th meeting, BOJ archive.
26. Besides this plan, there was also an August 1928 plan concerning a purchase limit on GBs. The MOF agreed to
the BOJ’s offer, setting a purchase limit, on the condition that it adopted the proportional reserve system. This
plan indicated that government bills and GBs should not exceed the maximum 40 percent limit of a fiduciary
issue. However, the Joint Research Committee determined that it would discuss the criteria of eligible securities
for fiduciary issue after examining actual figures, and the agreement was withdrawn in 1928.
27. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 33rd meeting, BOJ archive.
28. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the sixth meeting, BOJ archive.
29. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 33rd meeting, BOJ archive.issue by BOJ underwriting, we should limit the holding of GBs appropriated for 
a fiduciary issue.”
30 The dominant opinion was that BOJ appropriation of GBs
should be allowed only within the limit of a fiduciary issue and not as an excess 
issue. Although it was the second-best solution, the BOJ assertion was temporarily
accepted. However, a final decision was postponed, as further discussion on the 
organization and management of the BOJ was necessary.
31
After that, however, the MOF’s Banking Bureau argued that the above conclusion
was improper, giving the following explanation about the introduction of a purchase
limit. “There is an opinion that the supply of funds, defined as application, under-
writing, and purchase of GBs, should be limited. Such an opinion is appropriate only
if a suitable standard can be established. However, such a standard does not exist. If
we attempt to set a limit, it will be based on an arbitrary standard. In a meeting on
July 4, 1930, although we agreed to prepare a certain standard, we could not establish
a suitable one. Thus, we decided not to apply any restriction.”
32 This shows that
although the MOF basically consented to prepare a purchase limit on GBs, it did 
not accept a situation in which the BOJ could decide the purchase limit for GBs. In 
a document entitled “The Issue on the Revision of the BOJ Banknote Issuance
System,” which was based on the argument of the Joint Research Committee,
33 it was
decided that the securities suitable for a fiduciary issue should be listed. However, the
MOF did not accept the BOJ’s request for limiting the purchase of GBs. In the end,
the BOJ’s request was rejected. In this way, the purchase limit on GBs as securities for
a fiduciary issue, which was accepted in “Research on the BOJ,” was not accepted by
the Joint Research Committee.
To summarize, the BOJ approved the underwriting of GBs, and virtually ignored
a purchase limit on GBs. Later policy developments and their eventual results, 
such as wartime fiscal and monetary policy and postwar hyperinflation, show there
were serious defects in such a system design. Therefore, we must explain why the
BOJ adopted such a compromising attitude. To do so, I will examine arguments 
supporting new monetary control measures for BOJ underwriting.
B. The Absence of Regulation of Government Financing and Selling Operations
In 1930, the Joint Research Committee discussed new regulations concerning 
monetary control of the BOJ in “The Issue of Improving BOJ Operations.”
34 The
following five subjects were identified as proper business for the BOJ.
1. Discounting of bills issued by the government such as financing bills (FBs),
and discounting of bills such as commercial bills and banker’s acceptance bills.
2. Loans on securities such as GBs, and on silver or gold bullion, foreign currency
or commodities, and foreign exchange bills.
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30. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 29th meeting, BOJ archive.
31. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 33rd meeting, BOJ archive.
32. “April 1931, Explanation of the Revised Clause in BOJ Regulations,” in “Documents concerning a Meeting
about Revising BOJ Regulations, Volume 2,” BOJ archive.
33. “Nihon-Ginko-Enkakushi (The Collection of Historical Records of the Bank of Japan), Series 3, Overview 1.”
34. “Nihon-Ginko-Enkakushi (The Collection of Historical Records of the Bank of Japan), Series 3, Overview 1.”
We can regard this document as a compilation of discussions about the reform of the central banking system in
the Inoue period.3. Dealings in commercial bills or banker’s acceptance bills.
4. Application, underwriting, sale, and purchase of GBs and bills issued by the
government such as FBs.
5. Temporary and unsecured loans to the government, other than those referred
to in item 2.
As is often pointed out, these regulations basically provided legal confirmation of
what had already been implemented.
35 However, given the policy structure after the
implementation of the Takahashi economic policy, there were a number of problems.
First, the Joint Research Committee decided the BOJ could provide funds to the
government without collateral (item 5). Second, the application, underwriting, and
dealing of GBs and government securities were stipulated as BOJ business (item 4).
Thus, a system for supporting fiscal expansion was introduced. This revision 
followed MOF intentions, which set out to allow unrestricted BOJ holding of GBs.
The flexible currency issue system was closely connected with discretionary fiscal
management by the MOF.
At that time, financing of the government was “to be in the form of government
securities such as FBs in principle.”
36 That is, unsecured finance to the government
was restricted unconditionally. However, as FB issuance had reached its limit,
37
reflecting the deepening depression and the sharp decrease in tax revenues, it became
difficult for the government to be financed only through the underwriting of FBs.
Therefore, for the time being, the MOF and the BOJ determined that the BOJ could
also lend without discounting securities. In these circumstances, unsecured finance to
the government was stipulated.
In addition to easing BOJ financing of the government, the BOJ’s monetary 
control function was enhanced (item 4). FB sales, which had not been permitted
before, were allowed. The MOF’s permission in GB dealing, which had been needed,
was no longer necessary. The BOJ’s political intentions behind the institutional
changes that enabled fiscal expansion and enhancement of its monetary control can
be summarized in the following two points.
First, strengthening intervention in the market had become an urgent priority 
for the BOJ. This contrasts with a decrease in the BOJ’s ordinary loans and in 
its influence over financial institutions.
38 At the time, the BOJ recognized that it was
difficult to impose monetary control through large banks because Japan’s five major
banks enjoyed increased power and could disregard BOJ commands.
39 Under such
conditions, the BOJ could have extended business relations with only minor banks
and individual customers. However, the Joint Research Committee stressed that “the
BOJ should not be satisfied with being the bank of commercial banks. Rather, it
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35. Yoshino (1962), p. 315.
36. “April 1931, Explanation of the Revised Clause in BOJ Regulations,” BOJ archive.
37. The maximum limit of an FB issue was to be ¥100 million by regulation of Article 6 in the Public Account Law.
However, the limit was immediately expanded to ¥150 million in fiscal 1930 and to ¥250 million in fiscal 1931,
and the frequency of its issue increased rapidly (six times in fiscal 1929, 19 times in fiscal 1930, and 19 times in
fiscal 1931).
38. The BOJ’s loans and discounts outstanding decreased sharply from ¥265.14 million (December 1925) to
¥52.03 million (December 1929).
39. “April 1931, Explanation of the Revised Clause in BOJ Regulations,” BOJ archive.should be the central organization of all financial institutions.” Therefore, “it is not
appropriate to conduct individual dealings and to compete with other commercial
banks in our country’s present condition.”
40 Consequently, policies were proposed
not to increase individual dealings but to promote the development of financial 
markets and strengthen relations between the BOJ and markets through open 
market operations.
41
However, such open market operations were assumed to be selling operations. 
In 1930, maintaining the gold embargo required high interest rates, and business
conditions became very serious, so the demand for funds decreased. On the other
hand, the BOJ held a large amount of long-term fixed-relief loans and there was a
surplus of bank funds. Therefore, the financial markets eased, the dependence 
on BOJ ordinary loans decreased, and monetary control by the BOJ became more
difficult.
42 Thus, it was indispensable for the BOJ to seek policy instruments to
absorb liquidity from financial markets and increase its influence over financial 
institutions. This policy, which started at the beginning of the Takahashi economic
policy, made the BOJ compromise on issues of BOJ underwriting and unsecured
finance to the government. However, at the same time, an environment emerged
where the BOJ could exert its influence over financial institutions.
43
Second, in accepting the underwriting of GBs, the BOJ believed it could prevent
the currency expansion through selling operations.
44 In October 1932, BOJ Governor
Hisaakira Hijikata expressed confidence in monetary control, addressing BOJ 
underwriting: “As we may expect investors to purchase government bonds, BOJ
underwriting of government bonds need not lead directly to the expansion of a 
currency issue.”
45
To summarize, a basic reason for the BOJ’s compromise with the MOF was 
the BOJ’s desire to strengthen its power of intervention in financial markets and its
influence over financial institutions. The BOJ was also confident it could maintain
monetary control even with BOJ underwriting. The BOJ and the MOF agreed to
relax regulations on government financing, but concerning the revision of the 
banknote issuance system, the BOJ failed to set a purchase limit on GBs.
Nevertheless, we cannot overlook the fact that the BOJ willingly introduced selling
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40. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 30th meeting, BOJ archive.
41. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 31st meeting, BOJ archive.
42. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-1,” the 30th meeting, BOJ archive. Finance
Minister Inoue inquired, “In order to effectively control financial markets, shouldn’t we allow for the market
conditions where financial institutions require BOJ financing?” A BOJ committee member responded, “There
are already enough loans outstanding. However, these loans become fixed. So this is virtually the same as when
we have no loans outstanding. As a result, there is a large amount of funds in the financial market.”
43. Along with increasing intervention in financial markets, the selling operation was recognized as a means of
adjusting money market rates. Although there were problems with BOJ underwriting, the BOJ intended to
strengthen monetary control in accordance with market function.
44. One BOJ participant asserted, however, that since the term of GB redemption was quite long, if the Bank 
did not sell the bonds off, it could not absorb liquidity. “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1,
No. 1-1,” the 34th meeting, BOJ archive.
45. “The Reference for Home Branch Managers’ Meetings,” “The BOJ’s Documents on Home Branch Managers’
Meetings, 1932, Spring-Autumn,” BOJ archive. It can be argued that as the background of the above two points,
especially the latter, policy developments in foreign central banks were influential. The BOJ was investigating
changes in instruments for monetary control of central banks in various countries, such as the Bank of England,
the Federal Reserve, and the Reichsbank. “The Business of Central Banks in England, the United States, Germany,
and France” in “The Report for Improving the BOJ’s System, Vol. 1, No. 1-2,” BOJ archive.operations to strengthen its financial market function and maintain its influence over
financial institutions and its power of market control.
III. The Transition of Monetary Policy and the Budget Process
during the Takahashi Economic Policy Period
This section will examine policy developments after the Joint Research Committee
disbanded in 1931, and investigate the relationship between fiscal management and
monetary control through selling operations during the Takahashi economic policy
period. After 1932, when BOJ underwriting of GBs started, ease in selling operations
was recognized as one of the policy variables for measuring fiscal soundness.
46 This
was similar to arguments presented in the Joint Research Committee. Thus, to properly
evaluate the system design in this committee, one should look at the relationship
between market intervention by selling operations and fiscal management after 1932.
Table 1 shows the developments in the financing of the private sector from fiscal
47
1932 to 1936, or roughly the Takahashi economic policy period. Government
48
payments in 1933 were extremely large. This was due to a rapid increase in the refunds
of food FBs,
49 as well as general payments
50 by the government reaching the highest
level during these five years. However, the massive flow of funds into the private sector
in the same period was offset by the sale of GBs and FBs, especially food FBs.
Consequently, the overall flow into the private sector was only ¥51.7 million in fiscal
1933, as compared to ¥395.1 million in fiscal 1932. During these years, monetary 
policy was dedicated to absorbing excess liquidity in the financial market.
In fiscal 1934, BOJ GB sales peaked, and general payments by the government
were restrained. Consequently, the inflow of funds to the private sector turned into
an outflow of ¥10.6 million. However, in looking at the figures closely, the second
half of fiscal 1934 and all of fiscal 1935 provided the turning point in terms of 
monetary control. GB sales in the second half of fiscal 1934 were lower than the
same period of the previous year. In the first half of fiscal 1935, GB sales decreased
by about ¥250 million, while general spending increased slightly. These changes
reflected a surge in demand for funds in the private sector. Consequently, the inflow
to the private sector jumped to ¥89.8 million, the highest since fiscal 1933, when
selling operations first hit their stride.
As a whole, monetary control based on selling operations succeeded through 
the Takahashi economic policy period. When the demand for funds in the private
sector stagnated, the market liquidity, which increased rapidly due to BOJ financing
of the government, was absorbed through the purchase of GBs by private financial
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46. Ide (1998). As stated later, the BOJ carefully observed market trends, and as stagnation of GB sales became
apparent, the BOJ advised the MOF to reduce GB issuance.
47. April to March for the respective years.
48. This section defines “government” as the national government hereafter unless otherwise indicated. Local 
government falls under the “private sector.”
49. The food FB was an FB issued by the government to adjust for seasonal discrepancy of funds in terms of buying
and selling crops such as rice.













































Table 1  Flow of Funds into/out of the Private Sector
¥ thousands
General  Debt payments Increase/ 
FY payments by Government GB sales  FB sales BOJ sales decrease of 
the government GBs FBs
payment total by the BOJ by the BOJ total funds in the 
private sector
1932 First half 49,800 87,900 451,900 258,900 0 243,000 208,800 50,100
(–95,600) (–235,100) (–10,900) (–23,300)
Second half 450,200 89,900 233,800 653,000 16,300 291,700 308,000 345,000
(–91,100) (–29,800)
Total 500,000 177,800 685,700 911,900 16,300 534,700 516,800 395,100
(–186,700) (–264,900) (–10,900) (–23,300)
1933 First half 345,500 — 840,000 1,185,500 462,200 880,500 1,342,700 –157,200
Second half 345,500 — 480,600 826,100 326,400 290,800 617,200 208,900
Total 691,000 — 1,320,600 2,011,600 788,600 1,171,300 1,959,900 51,700
1934 First half 292,300 87,500 471,000 850,800 602,600 374,600 977,200 –126,400
Second half 197,100 10,000 353,000 560,100 297,800 146,500 444,300 115,800
Total 489,400 97,500 824,000 1,410,900 900,400 521,100 1,421,500 –10,600
1935 First half 314,400 — 335,800 650,200 351,700 366,700 718,400 –68,200
Second half 156,600 189,400 419,800 765,800 303,100 304,700 607,800 158,000
Total 471,000 189,400 755,600 1,416,000 654,800 671,400 1,326,200 89,800
1936 First half 150,100 844,400 394,000 693,900 505,000 411,400 899,200 –205,300
(–694,600) (–17,200)
Second half 301,600 1,217,000 400,600 774,100 180,700 340,400 521,100 253,000
(–1,145,100)
Total 451,700 2,061,400 794,600 1,468,000 685,700 751,800 1,420,300 47,700
(–1,839,700) (–17,200)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate gross inflow of funds, e.g., debt payments and buying operations for GBs and FBs in 1932 and 1936.
Source: Bank of Japan, Zaisei Kin’yu Shiryo Yoroku (Fiscal and Monetary Indicators), various issues.At the time, some argued that consistency between the absorption of funds through
selling operations and fiscal expenditures by the government could not be maintained
in such a policy framework.
52 However, the BOJ regarded market operations as far
more practical than changes in official discount rates, because the BOJ could not
expect to change official discount rates as a form of monetary control.
53
It is well known that economic recovery with low inflation was achieved. Figure 1
shows developments in the money supply, wholesale prices, and national income 
during this period. Although wholesale prices and money supply were very stable,
national income gradually increased.
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Table 2  Deposits, Loans, and GB Investment
¥ thousands, except where noted
CY 1931 32 33 34 35 36
Deposits
Fixed and saving  4,884,929 4,766,430 5,049,272 5,514,156 6,027,987 6,686,277 accounts
Special and checking  3,446,957 3,619,793 3,843,853 4,013,894 4,027,786 4,433,166 accounts
Total (A) 8,331,886 8,386,223 8,893,125 9,528,050 10,055,773 11,119,443
Loans
Loans on bills and  5,238,002 4,878,360 4,659,785 4,523,337 4,665,852 5,008,023 deeds
Discount bills and  1,599,546 1,813,700 1,945,041 1,897,823 2,049,293 2,248,565 overdrafts
Total (B) 6,837,548 6,692,060 6,604,826 6,421,160 6,715,145 7,256,588
(A) – (B) 1,494,338 1,694,163 2,288,299 3,106,890 3,340,628 3,862,855
Banks’ GB holdings 1,328,280 1,080,950 1,491,465 1,998,148 2,220,387 2,558,296
Loans/deposits  82.1 79.8 74.3 67.4 66.8 65.3 (percent)
GBs/fixed and saving  27.2 22.7 29.5 36.2 36.8 38.3 accounts (percent)
Source: Ministry of Finance (1939).
51. Bank of Japan (1984), p. 44. The BOJ determined whether to meet the offer from financial institutions for 
purchasing GBs after inquiring as to their finance condition. This differed considerably from open market 
operations in today’s sense.
52. Kin’yu Kenkyu Kai (Financial Study Group) (1936), p. 58. The Kin’yu Kenkyu Kai asserted that it expected 
fiscal expenditures to promote the business sector’s recovery from depression, but that monetary control by 
selling operations blocked recovery.
53. “BOJ Market Operations, January 1933” in “Documents on the Capacity for Government Bond Issue, January
1933–August 1935,” BOJ archive.
institutions. Table 2 shows developments in deposits, loans, and GB investment 
by banks. The table shows decreases in loans through 1934 and increases in GB
investment. Through this process, the BOJ conducted financial market operations
not through genuine open market operations but through negotiated transactions
with financial institutions.
51 The BOJ exerted influence over financial institutions
through allocating liquidity to each institution. Thus, it can be argued that the BOJ’s
policy objective in the Joint Research Committee was eventually attained.100 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 2003
However, this temporary success in monetary control and economic recovery does
not justify a policy framework based on BOJ credit. As confirmation, monetary 
control through selling operations functioned well, as the Joint Research Committee
had assumed. Also, when GB sales stagnated after the second half of fiscal 1934, BOJ
deficit financing of the government was reduced through consultation between the
BOJ and the MOF.
54 In response to increased demand for funds in the private sector
and stagnation of GB sales, the MOF opted for a gradual reduction of GB issues in
the budgetary process of fiscal 1936, and tried to reduce the budget deficit. This 
led the MOF to attempt to balance the fiscal 1936 budget.
55 In the budgetary
54. “Document Submitted by Vice-Governor Fukai to Financial Bureau Chief Aoki, August 1934” and “The
Reference on Government Bonds, May 1935” in “Documents on the Capacity for Government Bond Issue,
January 1933–August 1935,” BOJ archive. After the second half of 1934, Vice-Governor Fukai worried about
the feasibility of additional GB sales and consulted the MOF financial bureau chief. However, it seems that Fukai
did not reach a clear conclusion.
55. In the budgetary process of fiscal 1936, the MOF and Finance Minister Takahashi set a policy goal, the so-called
kokusai zengen seisaku (reduction of the deficit-financing government debt policy). The MOF set the target
amount of bond issue reduction as the equivalent of the natural increase in tax revenue. As a result, GB issuance
decreased by ¥91 million and the policy was achieved.
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Sources: Shozaburo Fujino, Nihon no Mane Sapurai (The Money Supply of Japan),
Keisoshobo, 1994 (in Japanese); 
Kazushi Ohkawa, Tsutomu Noda, Nobukiyo Takamatsu, Saburo Yamada,
Minoru Kumazaki, Yuichi Shionoya, and Ryoshin Minami, Choki Keizai Tokei
8: Bukka (Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868
8: Prices), Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1967 (in Japanese); 
Kazushi Ohkawa, Nobukiyo Takamatsu, and Yuzo Yamamoto, Choki Keizai
Tokei 1: Kokumin Shotoku (Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of
Japan since 1868 1: National Income), Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1974 
(in Japanese).process, however, irregular and problematic budgeting methods were adopted under
military pressure.
56
For example, multi-year continuing expenditures created a financial burden to be
incurred in the budgets over consecutive years. Both the total amount and the annual
spending schedule were to appear in the budget of each year. However, during 
this period fiscal authorities used this clause to postpone future fiscal burdens, 
especially those for military spending. In fiscal 1936, continuing expenditures for the
Department of the Army increased to ¥489.92 million from ¥140.87 million in the
previous year. Continuing expenditures also increased for the Department of the
Navy, to ¥484.88 million from ¥368.21 million. These two departments represented
about 70 percent of all continuing expenditures after fiscal 1936.
57 Moreover, since
the expected tax revenues in fiscal 1936 were ¥924.8 million, deferred military
expenditures reached half the total expected tax revenue in the same year. Thus, total
continuing expenditures amounted to ¥1,427.55 million in fiscal 1936, as compared
with the total fiscal 1936 budget of ¥2,278.13 million.
Despite a gradual decrease in GB issues, which Finance Minister Takahashi
achieved, long-term government debt increased to an enormous level, even before the
outbreak of the 2.26 incident.
58 The rapid increase in military expenditures after 
the 2.26 incident added to these hidden government debts, which were already
heavy. If one emphasizes the soft budget constraint before the 2.26 incident, there 
is a continuity between the Takahashi economic policy and wartime economic 
policy. Given that BOJ underwriting was institutionalized in 1932, we can easily
anticipate that BOJ financing of the government would be exploited to finance such
hidden fiscal burdens afterward. In fact, during and after World War II, the BOJ
made loans to the government and supplied funds for the private sector instead of 
the government.
IV. Concluding Remarks
A. Policy Formation Process
We can summarize the agreements between the BOJ and the MOF in the Joint
Research Committee in 1930 as follows.
Unsecured financing of the government and underwriting of GBs by the BOJ 
were institutionalized. The maximum purchase limit of GBs for the BOJ was not 
stipulated, and selling operations of government securities by the BOJ were permitted.
The MOF’s permission, which had been needed when dealing government securities,
became unnecessary. These agreements refute the conventional argument that the 
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56. These included accumulation of the deferred fiscal burden through the continuing expenditure clause, off-balance
fund transfers between the general account and special account, reduction of subsidies to local government with
increasing local government spending, and promotion of repayment of local bonds to draw funds for GB sales. 
See Ide (1998, 2001).
57. Continuing expenditures in fiscal 1935 were only ¥4.99 million for the Department of the Army, and ¥80.7 million
for the Department of the Navy.
58. The 2.26 incident was an attempted military coup d’etat in 1936 in which Finance Minister Takahashi was killed.
After this, military expenditures increased rapidly and Japanese fiscal management shifted to wartime finance.BOJ was persuaded to underwrite GBs by Finance Minister Takahashi’s firm request
and accepted it as a temporary expedient. Rather, the BOJ had its own reasons for
underwriting bonds. Confidence in monetary control through selling operations and
expectations of its influence over financial institutions contributed to the BOJ’s 
acceptance of GB underwriting.
B. Implementation Process
The above agreements were made in the Inoue economic policy period, but 
carried out during the Takahashi economic policy period. Considering the difficult
economic and social situation, which included a severe decrease in tax revenues due
to the Showa economic crisis, the Manchurian incident, and social unrest caused 
by the 5.15 incident,
59 we may regard BOJ underwriting and expansionary fiscal
expenditures as unavoidable political choices. In addition, BOJ monetary control was
strictly conducted and even functioned temporarily as a way to allow changes in fiscal
policy. Therefore, it can be argued that the BOJ’s system design in the Joint Research
Committee was well grounded. However, in spite of the shift in 1935–36 to a tight
fiscal policy, it was difficult for the BOJ to stop underwriting GBs. The MOF used
irregular and problematic budgeting methods during and after the budgetary process
of fiscal 1936, and this led to a large deferred fiscal burden. The BOJ was forced 
to continue underwriting deficit-financing bonds to cover this expanding financial
demand. This was the flaw in the BOJ’s system design in the Joint Research
Committee, which allowed for easy financing by the government. The problem in this
policy was, despite its apparent consistency with economic recovery, that it created an
unanticipated policy structure under political pressure, which would later become
impossible to abolish.
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59. The 5.15 incident was the attempted military coup d’etat in 1932, in which Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai was
killed. His assassination significantly hastened the end of party politics in prewar Japan.103
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